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iAbstract
There are at least a few hundred published protocols that fall in
the category of authentication and key establishment. Under a naive
definition of authentication and key establishment, the existence of so
many protocols is quite fascinating and somewhat stunning for a new-
comer to the field of communication security. One potent argument
often presented is we keep designing new protocols due the demand of
new type of applications and due to the discovery of flaws in existing
protocols. While designing new protocols for new type of applications,
such as RFID, is definitely an important driving factor nevertheless the
most among the published protocols are in fact the result of discovery of
flaws in their predecessors.
As our understanding of cryptography and protocol analysis is get-
ting mature, the ability to discover new flaws in the protocols also in-
creases. We now have a better understanding of actual operational en-
vironment. In past, this often caused increasing the power of attacker
model, for instance, now a days we also consider privacy concerns and
side channel leakage beside the classic Dolev-Yao attacker.
A protocol is labeled as insecure protocol once an effective attack
or flaw is found in it. In fact, the most of the published protocols are
considered insecure from this point of view. In practice, however, this
approach has a side effect, namely, we rarely bother to explore how much
insecure is the protocol. This question asks us to explore the area be-
tween security and insecurity; after all neither a flawed protocol is always
completely insecure neither all applications require the security against
an all powerful attacker.
The current approach towards security analysis, which we call strict
security, considers a protocol along with a powerful attacker, such as
Dolev-Yao attacker and sometimes with additional capabilities such as
dynamic corruption of communicating nodes. Then, one tries to show
that the protocol achieves its objective under this specific attacker. Nat-
urally there are three possibilities: one may succeed in constructing a
security proof; one may fail in proving security, which often makes the
protocol suspicious; or one may discover a concrete attack, which def-
initely makes the protocol insecure under such strict definition of the
attacker.
There is however an alternate — adaptable security, which we pro-
pose as a more general approach to the security problem. The approach
considers correct protocols, i.e., protocols that achieve their objectives
when there exist no effective attacker. All correct protocols are assumed
to be secure and the challenge we pose for a security analyst is to derive
the least strongest attacker (LSA) model for which the, so-called, a priori
assumption about security holds. In this way, the security definition of
a protocol can be adapted to suitable choice of LSA.
Another aspect of the proposed approach is the flexible treatment of
security goals; we decompose high level security goals in many fine level
goals and a protocol may achieve only a subset of all fine level goals. We
believe that these flexible choices of attackers and security goals are more
ii
practical in many real world scenarios. An applications may require the
protection against a weaker attacker and may require to achieve fewer
security goals.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Entity authentication protocols are used to verify the ‘identity’ of a far-end
entity. This may appear to be a simple goal, but in reality it entails establish-
ing many fine level authentication goals (FLAGs) [4], which are listed in the
following:
Existence If an entity A verifies that the peer entity once existed on the
network, then A is said to achieve the goal Existence. Existence does
not require any timeliness property or even the awareness that peer
entities have achieved the goal. Existence only guarantee that an entity
once existed on the network and have sent some message.
Operativeness If an entity A verifies that a peer entity currently exist on
the network, then A is said to achieve the goal operativeness.
Willingness If an entity A verifies that once a peer entity B wanted to
communicate with A, then A is said to achieve the goal Willingness for
B. Note that there is no timeliness requirement associated with this
goal.
Single-sided Authentication Single-sided authentication is achieved if an
entity A verifies that the peer entity B is currently ready to communicate
with A.
Confirmation If an entity A verifies that the peer entity B knows that X
has achieved a security goal G (with Y as peer entity), then A is said to
achieve the goal confirmation for G from B.
Strong Single-sided Authentication Strong single-sided authentication is
achieved if an entity A has the confirmation for the corresponding single-
sided authentication from B. Intuitively, it means that A not only (cur-
rently) authenticates B, but also has the assurance that B knows about
this event.
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Mutual Authentication If an entity A verifies that both parties (A and
peer entity B) currently want to communicate with each other, then A
is said to achieve Mutual Authentication.
Strong Mutual Authentication Strong mutual authentication is achieved
if an entity A has the confirmation for the corresponding mutual authen-
tication from B.
Sometimes it is assumed that an adversary can corrupt entities. In that
case forward and backward security [9] are also important.
Traditionally, the objective of an authentication protocol designer is to
provide the strongest possible security. So-called “standard authentication
models” normally incorporate a quite powerful adversary and then the security
analysis is aimed at verifying whether a given protocol is secure or not. The
most common example is the use of Dolev-Yao attacker1[13] in the security
models used in most of the tools based on formal analysis [2, 1, 7]. Similarly,
various accepted definitions of security, e.g, correspondence [27] or intensional
properties [22], may implicitly include all of the aforementioned FLAGs.
Often vulnerabilities are identified in the authentication protocols, based
on a security analysis that use some standard security model. In many cases,
however, exploitation of these vulnerabilities may not be practical and, more-
over, not all application may suffer because of the identified vulnerabilities.
For example, many attacks on authentication protocols2 work because the ad-
versary can delete some message from a sender to the receiver. In practice,
deletion of a transmitted message, however, is not always practical, especially
if the communication medium is wireless.
Therefore, one may need to analyze a protocol for the weaker notions of
security. We introduce the notion of an adaptable authentication model for the
type of reasoning which estimates the actual level of security provided by an
authentication protocol, i.e., we infer suitable values of different parameters
in the authentication model such that the protocol can be shown secure; these
different parameters may include the attacker capabilities and the assumptions
about the operating environment.
In the adaptable authentication model, the overall goals of an authen-
tication protocol are broken into a finer granularity; for each fine level au-
thentication goal, we determine the “Least Strongest-Attacker” for which the
authentication goal can be satisfied. We demonstrate that this model can
be used to reason about the security of supposedly insecure protocols. Such
adaptability is particularly useful in those applications where one may need
to trade-off the security relaxations against the resource requirements.
1Informally, such an attacker runs the communication network, and therefore can insert,
delete, modify, delay and replay the messages. The attacker, however, can not break standard
cryptographic schemes, such as encryption and signature.
2For example, see Chapter 3 in the book of Boyd and Mathuria [8].
3Note that our methodology is fundamentally different from the traditional
one in which the parameters of a security model are fixed. For example, it
is not clear how to use a formal analysis tool [7] if, e.g., we assume that the
attacker can not delete messages, without undergoing the redesign of the tool
itself.
The adaptable authentication model makes it possible to reason about the
weaker notions of security (such as if an attacker can not delete messages);
not doing so may result in using inefficient protocols and discarding slightly
insecure protocols. Not all real-world applications require the highest level of
security (e.g., see Ksiezopolski et al.[16]); and some of the rest can not afford
to implement the required level of security due to resource constraints (e.g.,
see Burmester et al.[9], Lindskog’s thesis [17]).
In practice, most of the cryptographic protocols are designed to achieved
additional security goals, besides entity authentication, because a subsequent
communication is required. Some of these goals are defined in the following.
Freshness If an entity A verifies that a value v is currently sent by a peer
entity then A is said to achieve the goal freshness for v.
Integrity If an entity A verifies that a value v is same as sent by a peer entity
(who may be unknown) then A is said to achieve the goal integrity for
v.
Authenticity If an entity A verifies that a value v is sent by some X, such
that X ∈ ∆, then A is said to achieve ∆-authenticity for v.
Traceability The goal traceability for an entity A is achieved by an adversary
if it is possible to extract the identity of A from the protocol.
Linkability The goal linkability is achieved by an adversary if two instances
a protocol, which involve the same initiator or responder, are linkable.
Revelation The goal revelation for a value v is achieved if v can be efficiently
extracted after the execution of a protocol.
Entity authentication only represents a subset of all communication se-
curity goals, still there are many applications where mere authentication —
without subsequent communication — is required. One such domain, which
we also consider in this report, is RFID. One motivation of doing so is to
convey the core idea behind the adaptable authentication model in its simplest
form. Nevertheless, we believe that the core idea can be extended to other
communication security goals3.
The design of RFID based security protocols is a relatively challenging task
because RFID tags are resource constrained devices with only a little memory
3This, however, may require a different construction of security property β that is de-
scribed in the next chapter.
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and limited computational and communication capabilities. These constrains
mandate the use of light-weight cryptography. This is not the only challenge
however. The generic attacker for typical RFID system is very powerful, as
the tags are not assumed to be tamper-proof. Moreover, privacy also needs
to be considered in the design of RFID protocols — the use of RFID based
identification in wearable items can lead to serious privacy concerns, e.g., some
people may not want to be publicly identifiable if they wear clothes that have
embedded RFID tags.
We believe that Adaptable authentication model could be extremely useful
in such applications where it is not feasible to implement the highest level
of security and where the need of a trade-off, between security and resource
constraints, exists. We however do not consider any of RFID domain specific
problems, e.g., the efficiency of reader side of a protocol, side channel attacks
and relay attacks, which may also be crucial to feasibility of an authentication
protocol.
We start by briefly considering the related work in § 1.1. In Chapter 2
we describe the theoretical foundation of the model. This is followed by the
concrete definitions of the model in § 2.2. We consider a simple RFID system
and reason about the security of a generic authentication protocol in Chap-
ter 3. In Chapter 4 we discuss the usefulness of our contribution and at last,
in § 4.1, we conclude the work. All the proofs of security can be found in
Appendix A.
1.1 Related Work
Here we only mention some of the work directly related to flexibility in security
models. Various other style of formal definitions for authentication can be
found, e.g., spi-calculus [2], type theory [1]. The readers are referred to
Avoine’s thesis [5] for a general introduction and prior art of RFID security
and privacy at that time. Outside the RFID community, the book of Boyd
et al. [8] contains a large number of authentication protocols and the list of
reported attacks against them.
Security and performance trade-offs in client-server environments are stud-
ied in Authenticast [23], which is a dynamic authentication protocol. The
adaptation is due to flexible selection of key length, algorithm and the per-
centage of total packets that are authenticated. The term Quality of Protec-
tion (QoP) is also used to describe adaptable security models. Ong, et al.[20],
address the problems introduced by the traditional view of security — a sys-
tem is either secure or insecure— by defining different security levels based on
key size, block size, type of data and interval of security.
Hager [15], in his thesis, consider the trade-offs of security protocols in
wireless network; but, the security adaption is only on the basis of perfor-
mance, energy, and resource consumption. Covington, et al.[11], propose Pa-
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rameterized Authentication, in which quality of authentication is described in
terms of sensor trustworthiness and the accuracy of the measurements.
Lindskog [17] develop some solutions in his thesis, for tuning security for
networked applications. The proposed methods are however limited to con-
fidentiality. Instead of using just one instance of authentication protocol, in
some approaches, e.g., by Ganger [14], over a period of time a system can fuse
observations about the entities into a kind of probabilistic authentication.
Ksiezopolski, et al.[16], describe the problem of an unnecessarily high level
of security that may have impacts on dependability; they present an informal
model of adaptable security, which, however, is difficult to justify for the
soundness of results. Sun, et al.[25], propose an evaluation method for QoP,
based on normalized weighted tree. Most of the existing QoP based approaches
can not be justified on concrete basis of modern cryptography. Interestingly,
most of the foundational work for adaptable authentication is in the domain
of RFID.
Many of the proposed RFID protocols, [6][18], are too heavy for low cost
tags, and not supported by EPCGen2 [24]. Burmester, et al.[9], reports that
five different proposals that are compliant to EPCGen2 but have some se-
curity vulnerabilities. Currently, there are many parallel efforts going on to
develop (adaptable) privacy models that can be used to capture the security
and privacy requirements in order to optimize the resource requirement for
the protocols.
Damgård et al.[12] study the trade-offs between complexity and security
using secret key cryptography. They propose a weaker but more practical
notion of privacy; strong privacy requires a separate and independent key for
each of the RFID tags. Vaudenay [26] uses eight different attacker models
to reason about the privacy of RFID identification protocols. The strongest
notion of privacy in Vaudenay’s model is shown to be impossible to achieve;
even the two other strong models mandate the use of public key cryptography.
This model also serve as a inspiration for much of the following work where
the authors model the adversary as a class of attacker models, e.g., Paise et
al.[21], Yu Ng et al. [19] and Canard et al.,[10].
The proposal in this report is radical in the sense that we define adaptabil-
ity over the definition of authentication. In all previous work, adaptability is
defined over the attacker’s capabilities, strength of cryptographic algorithms,
trustworthiness of credentials or use of multiple channels (e.g., multi-factor
authentication, context-aware authentication). Some of our previous work,
[4][3], can be considered as a pre-cursor to this work; the major developments
in this report are the proposal of general operational definitions for authenti-
cation, use of probabilistic proofs for LSAs (least strongest attackers) and the
evaluation of our model in the RFID domain.

Chapter 2
The Adaptable Model
Traditionally, protocols are analyzed for security using a fixed security model
that typically incorporates an all powerful attacker. The end-result of such an
analysis is the answer to whether or not the given protocol is secure or not.
This approach is intuitively described in the following metaphoric example.
Imagine a system where the only feasible operation is multiplication and
our task is to establish the truth value of expressions of type a.x ≥ b, where
a, b, x ∈ D and D is a finite subset of natural numbers. Let, a and b are the
given values in the specification of expression, while x is an unknown value.
Of course, the natural approach for solving this problem is to assume x =
x⊥, where x⊥ is the smallest number in D and then evaluate the expression,
a.x⊥ ≥ b. This approach is similar to how security is analyzed traditionally —
in which the evaluation of the expression is replaced by the security analysis,
a corresponds to a given protocol, b is the required security goals for a, and
x⊥ is the security model that incorporates the all powerful attacker.
On the other hand, by initially assuming a given protocol as a secure
protocol, we may need to find out the “strongest” security model for which
the initial assumption remains valid. Metaphorically, we assume a.x ≥ b to
be true and try to find out the smallest x in D such that this assumption
remains valid. For this purpose, a naive (brute-force) approach is to iterate
the evaluation of expression: start with the largest x; if the expression is valid
then decrement x and repeat the process, otherwise, the value of x in previous
iteration is the solution. Similarly, such a naive approach for security requires
iterating the security analysis over the possible types of security models.
In our proposal, we present a single framework that can be used to find out
such a “strongest security model”. Metaphorically, we try to solve a.x ≥ b as
an inverse problem, even though x = a/b is not feasible to compute directly.
The precise description of our main idea and its formal construction is in the
following.
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2.1 Theory
Let Θ be a background theory1, α be an attacker model, Π be an authen-
tication protocol and G be one of the authentication goals2. The standard
approach towards security analysis is in the following general form.
Θ,Π, α |= G (2.1)
The above argument represents the security analysis as a process in which
one tries to show, under the security model {Θ, α}, that G can be achieved
by running an instance of Π. It must be noted that the above argument is
not confined to classic mathematical logic; the meaning of ‘|=’ depends on
the type of analysis, e.g., in complexity theoretic cryptography |= stands for
reductionist type proofs, in formal analysis it may stand for static analysis [2].
We aim to formulate the above argument as an inverse problem, in order
to determine certain parameters of the security model such that G can be
inferred. In place of Equation 2.1, we use the following two abductive style
arguments in the Adaptable authentication model.
Θ,Π, β |= G (2.2)
Θ,Π, α |= β (2.3)
We refer to Equation 2.2 as the Beta argument and Equation 2.3 as the
Alpha argument. These two arguments are proposed to divide the classic
authentication problem (Equation 2.1) in two, by introducing an intermediate
statement β. The concrete form of β is defined in § 2.2. For now, β may be
considered as a special security property over the protocol messages.
Two types of processes are involved in both of the arguments above. The
first one is an abduction process, which refers to hypothesizing β in the Beta
argument and α in the Alpha argument. The second process is called valida-
tion process, which deals with the validity of the arguments itself. So, in total
we need to consider the following four processes.
1. Abduction process in the Beta argument, i.e., hypothesizing β
2. Validation process in the Beta argument, i.e., validating G
3. Abduction process in the Alpha argument, i.e., hypothesizing α
4. Validation process in the Alpha argument, i.e., validating β
The process of hypothesizing β is trivial, as a Π in the class of authen-
tication protocols typically contains a relatively small number of base terms.
1 A security model may consists of environment model, system model, attacker model
α, semantics of terms, etc; Θ refers to all these components except α.
2 For more details see Definition of Authentication [4].
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So, we can exhaustively search the possible space of β. For example, if Π is
a challenge response protocol then there are only two messages, a challenge
m1 and a response m2; the possibilities for which β may be satisfied are only
three: {m1,m2}, {m1} and {m2}.
The validation process for G in the Beta argument is defined in § 2.2 under
the names of operational definitions. A valid β in the Beta argument is just
an hypothesis in the complete model and thus a separate validation argument
for β is required, which is the Alpha argument. If the Alpha argument can be
validated, for some α, then β becomes a valid statement, but apparently at
the cost of α being a hypothesis.
Traditionally, the issue ‘α as a hypothesis’ — i.e., α really models the
attacker for a specific domain? — is not so important because α usually models
an ‘all powerful attacker’. For example, the Dolev-Yao attacker [13] is believed
to subsume all conceivable attackers in most computer networks. So, one can
safely assume the validity of the hypothesis (Dolev-Yao attacker) while, e.g.,
deploying a ‘secure’ authentication protocol in a cooperate network. In our
proposal, however, the hypothesis α may correspond to a weaker attacker.
Therefore, α obtained in the Adaptable authentication model should not be
assumed valid by default and a decision, whether α is reasonable to assume
or not, must be made in an application specific manner.
For the Alpha argument, we outline a Hybrid process that incorporates
both the abduction process (i.e., hypothesizing α for a given β) and a vali-
dation process (i.e., validating β using Θ, Π and α). The Hybrid process is
overall sound3 if the validation process is sound.
The Hybrid process: The Hybrid process starts with the validation process
of the Alpha argument by assuming the capabilities of most powerful
attacker, say αi, relevant to the given system model. If the validation
process fails then depending on the cause of failure we weaken αi to αi+1
and continue with the validation process once again; the loop continues
until the validation process succeed. The α for which the validation
process succeed is the least strongest attacker (LSA).
Consequently, the resultant LSA is not necessarily correspond to some
standard attacker model, such as the Dolev-Yao attacker [13]. As long as
the validity process is sound, αi at ith iteration is rejected if it is not a valid
hypothesis. The existence of any undiscovered ‘stronger’ LSA does not invali-
date the earlier results, as any weaker attacker model is always a subset of the
stronger model. Thus, the soundness of the Hybrid process is not a defeasible
guarantee4, as long as the background theory Θ remains the same.
The Alpha and the Beta arguments could be probabilistic,5 i.e., there is
3 But, the process may not be complete or optimum.
4 In classic reasoning, a valid but defeasible argument has the possibility of invalidation
when more premises are added.
5 For example, in complexity theoretic proofs of security (e.g., see §2.6 [8])
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some probability p < 1 that a goal G is valid assuming the validity of Θ, Π
and β. Similarly, there is some probability q < 1 that a β is valid assuming
the validity of the premises Θ, Π and α. In the complete model, G is achieved
with a probability that is a function of p and q. The probabilistic concerns do
not arise until we actually start validating the alpha and beta arguments.
To sum up, we highlight the two aspects that form the basis of the adapt-
ability of Adaptable authentication model. The first aspect is the way we for-
mulated the Alpha and the Beta arguments; the Beta argument is ‘attacker
independent’; the Alpha argument is ’goal independent’. The second aspect
is the abductive style treatment of the two arguments, namely the traditional
security problem (whether G can be satisfied under a standard security model)
is formulated as an inverse problem by breaking it in to four smaller problems:
abductive and validation process for both Alpha and Beta arguments. This
allows us to infer an actual security model for which a given authentication
protocol is secure.
2.2 Binding Sequence
In this section, we present the generic forms of (1) β, (2) the validation process
of the Beta argument and (3) a restricted form of the Hybrid process. The
validation of the Beta argument means how to infer an authentication goal G
from Θ, Π and β; in our case, however, G is one of the authentication goals.
We define this validation process with the operational definitions of G that
are in terms of β. We define the Hybrid process at an abstract level, i.e., for
arbitrary form of α, Π and Θ; an example of β with a concrete Hybrid process
(i.e., for the specific choices of α, Π and Θ) can be found in Chapter 3
Consider a network of entities who communicate with each other through
message passing protocols; the protocols under consideration are of entity
authentication. A protocol Π may be executed among two or more entities.
An instance of Π is denoted by Π(i), where i is an index. We propose the
following definition of binding sequence as a concrete form of β.
Binding Sequence: A sequence of protocol messages is called a binding se-
quence βX if the violation of any of the following properties generate an
efficiently detectable event for an entity X.
1. Deletion/Insertion/Modification of a message in βX .
2. Changing the sequence of messages in βX .
Intuitively, a binding sequence is a list of selected messages that preserves
their ‘integrity’, as all unauthorized changes in βX should be detectable for
X; of course, βX may be replayed. Note that such an integrity property of
βX is different from the integrity of the messages it contains. A βX can be
constructed from completely unauthenticated messages.
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We define the following encoding from a list L to a set S. Let the size (the
number of elements) of list is |L| and every element in the list is addressable
by a unique index i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ |L|. The ith element in L is li and is
encoded in the following set si, such that si ∈ S: si ::= {li} ∪ {lsi−1}. In this
way, a binding sequence βX has an equivalent set representation and therefore
the following set operations are defined accordingly: ∈, ⊂ and ⊆.
2.3 Validation process of the Beta argument
Next, we propose operational definitions as a validation process of the Beta
argument, namely we define the authentication goals for X in terms of βX .
Our formulation is for a two-party case, but it is trivial to extend them to
multi-party case6. In the following A and B denote specific network entities,
while X represents an arbitrary network entity. These operational definitions
are also illustrated in Figure 2.1.
Existence: Let βA(i) and βA(j) be generated when A executes the protocol
with B and X respectively. If A can efficiently distinguish between
βA(i) and βA(j) (for all choices of X) then A is said to achieve the goal
existence of B from βA(i). This is abbreviated as EXST(A→ B, βA(i)).
Operativeness: Let βA(i) and βA(j) be generated when A executes the pro-
tocol twice with X . If A can efficiently distinguish between βA(i) and
βA(j) (for all choices of X) then A is said to achieve the goal operative-
ness for X. This is abbreviated as OPER(A→ B, βA(i)).
Willingness: Let βB(i) and βB(j) be generated when A and X execute the
protocol with B. If B can efficiently distinguish between βB(i) and βB(j)
for all choices of X then A is said to achieve the goal willingness for B,
from the corresponding binding sequence βA(i). This is abbreviated as
WLNG(A→ B, βA(i)).
Single-sided Authentication: If an entityA achieves OPER(A→ B, βA(i)),
EXST(A → B, βA(i)), and WLNG(A → B, βA(i)) then A is said to
achieve single sided authentication, abbreviated as SATH(A→ B, βA(i)).
In the above definition, the goals — existence, operativeness and will-
ingness —, are achieved in the same instance βA(i). If we assume that an
entity never proceeds from a step in a protocol run if she does not receives
the expected message in that step then we have the following definition of
confirmation.
6 For instance, if A is supposed to achieve G for both B and C then the operational
definition of G for A to B and for A to C must be satisfiable using a common βX .
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Figure 2.1: Operational Definitions: (a) Existence (b) Operativeness (c) Will-
ingness (d) Confirmation
Confirmation: Let βA(i) and β′A(i) be generated in a single run when A
executes the protocol with X and βA(i) ⊂ β′A(i). If A achieve some
goal G from βA(i) then A has the confirmation on G in βA(i). This is
abbreviated as CNFM(A→ B, βA(i)).
Intuitively, a subsequent message that is part of a binding sequence carries
the assurance that the peer entity has accepted all previous messages.
Strong Single-sided Authentication: If an entity A achieves SATH(A→
B, βA(i)) and CNFM(A → B, βA(i)) then A is said to achieve strong
single-sided authentication, abbreviated as SSATH(A→ B, βA(i)).
Intuitively, the above definition introduces the requirement of a “confir-
mation message”. Therefore, now, A has the assurance that B knows about
the achieved goal that A has authenticated B.
Mutual Authentication If an entity A achieves SATH(A→ B, β′A(i)) and
CNFM(A → B, βA(i)), such that βA(i) ⊂ β′A(i), βA(i) |= βB(i) and
SATH(B → A, βB(i)), then A is said to achieve mutual authentication,
abbreviated as MATH(A→ B, βA(i)).
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Strong Mutual Authentication If an entityA achieves SATH(A→ B, βA(i))
and CNFM(A → B, βA(i)), such that βA(i) |= βB(i) and SATH(B →
A, βB(i)), then A is said to achieve strong mutual authentication, abbre-
viated as SMATH(A→ B, βA(i)).
The difference between the above two definitions is in the relaxation,
βA(i) ⊂ β′A(i). Due to this relaxation A may not have the assurance that
B knows that A has authenticated B. In the case of strong mutual authenti-
cation, A do have this assurance, as the confirmation is on the same binding
sequence that is used in the single-sided authentication.
Next, we turn to the privacy related goals. We introduce a notion of con-
trollability as follows. A Π is controllable by peer entities if the union of their
binding sequences, ⋃Y βY , contains all the messages of Π, where Y is some
peer entity in Π. So, controllability implies that each protocol message is part
of at least one binding sequence belonging to the peer entities. Consequently,
we have the following relation for an instance Π(i) of a controllable protocol:
Π(i) = ⋃Y βY (i).
Anonymity Let Π(m) and Π(n) be the two instances of a controllable Π, such
that Π(m) involves an entity X and Π(n) does not involve X, as an ini-
tiator or responder. The goal Anonymity, abbreviated as ANMT(X,Π),
is achieved if an adversary A can not distinguish between Π(m) and
Π(n).
Untraceability Let Π(m), Π(n) and Π(o) be the three instances of a control-
lable Π, such that Π(m) and Π(n) involve X as an initiator or responder,
while Π(o) does not involve X. The gaol untraceability, or UNTC(X,Π),
is achieved if an adversary A can not pick the pair (Π(m),Π(n)) with
significantly different probability than either of the rest of two pairs,
namely (Π(m),Π(o)) and (Π(n),Π(o)).
2.4 Abstract Hybrid Process
At last, we define an abstract form of the Hybrid process, which is used to
hypothesize α and to validate β at the same time. For simplicity, we restrict
the abstract form to those protocols in which the number of messages are
fixed. Moreover, we assume that all messages are well typed. With these
restrictions, the only property that needs to be checked (as per definition of
binding sequence) is modification.
Consider an arbitrary binding sequence: βX = [m1, ...,mn], where n ≥ 1.
Let mi, with i < n, be an unmodified message in βX . Let m′i represents a
message obtained by modifying mi. Let ACCEPT(βX) be an event that X
accepts7 βX . Let MβX be a set that contains all choices of modified βX , e.g.,
7X accepts βX as per the definition of binding sequence.
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if βA = [m1,m2] then MβA = {[m′1,m2], [m1,m′2], [m′1,m′2]}. In general, MβX
contains 2n − 1 elements.
The generic Hybrid process: We consider each element of MβX and cal-
culate Pr(ACCEPT(βiX)), where βiX ∈ MβX and 1 ≥ i ≤ (2n − 1).
If Pr(ACCEPT(βiX)) is negligible then we consider another element in
MβX , until no element is left in MβX . If Pr(ACCEPT(βiX)) is not neg-
ligible, we include reasonable assumptions so that Pr(ACCEPT(βiX)) is
negligible under new assumptions. These additional assumption could
be related to α or the environment in which Π operates. In the worst
case, α is empty.8
In the next chapter, we demonstrate the utility of the Adaptable authen-
tication model by applying the approach to a relatively simple, but realistic,
system, namely RFID authentication. The purpose of the report, however, is
not to address the general RFID authentication and privacy problems.
8This corresponds to an attacker with no capabilities besides what is assumed in the
ideal execution of protocol.
Chapter 3
Case Study: A Simple RFID
System
All RFID tags that we consider here are passive transponders identified by an
ID; the ID is not necessarily unique. In reality this ID may correspond to the
item to which the tag is attached.
We define four classes of attacker capabilities: Destructive, αD; Forward,
αF ; Weak, αW ; and Coward, αC . An attacker A may belong to one of these
classes, which are modeled over the following set of oracles.
• CreateTag(k): A can create a tag with a key k stored in it.
• Launch(Π(i),ID): A can interact with a tag ID of his choice.
• Respond(Π(i)): A can respond to a RFID reader’s interrogation.
• Corrupt(ID): A can read all memory contents of any tag ID.
A in Destructive class can access all of these oracles, but, if A access
Corrupt oracle then the tag ID is destroyed as the tampering is assumed to
be detectable. Forward class is same as Destructive one, except no other type
of oracle can be accessed after an access to Corrupt oracle is made; additional
Corrupt queries are allowed. A in Weak class can not access Corrupt oracle.
A in Coward class can not invoke Corrupt and Respond oracles.
We consider a relatively simple system model, where there is one reader R
and n number of RFID tags1: IDi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n; each tag is attached to an item
in Warehouse. There is a single entry point Entry into Warehouse and a single
exit point Exit from Warehouse. Whenever an item passes through Entry, it
gets attached with a tag IDi and a relevant entry (IDi,Ki) is stored in the
reader’s database. When an item arrives at Exit, the tag is identified as IDi
1 The assumption of single reader is ubiquitous in most of the literature, e.g., see
Damgård [12], Vaudenay [26].
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by executing a protocol that is derived from the generic RFID authentication
protocol, which we specify later. When a tag IDi leaves Exit, it is killed (i.e.,
no more radio communication is possible with IDi) by R and database entry
(IDi,Ki) is removed.
The reader R may have multiple front-ends at Entry and Exit but has one
common back-end. In reality, the back-end could be a distributed system in
which the database of tags is synchronized in real-time. Whenever a tag is in
Exit, the authentication protocol is automatically executed.
An attacker A, in some attacker’s class, exists inside the warehouse from
where he can invoke the oracle queries following the rules of the attacker class.
In addition to that, A also has access to customer records. Privacy is defined
as protecting the relation between the item bought and the customer. We
assume that an attacker is not capable to ‘physically observe’ the item all the
way to a customer, but, if an attacker can link communication of a tag ID to
a customer at Exit then he can violate the privacy.
Usually, the concrete definitions of privacy and security are system de-
pendent. In our case, anonymity is not a concern as attacker is already in
Warehouse. Similarly, the reader at Exit is assumed honest and therefore
willingness is not a concern for security. We use the following definitions for
our RFID system.
Privacy: A protocol Π, involving R as an initiator and ID as a responder, is
private if untraceability, UNTC(ID,Π), can be achieved.
Security: A protocol Π , involving R as an initiator and ID as a responder, is
secure if existence, EXST(R→ ID, βR), and operativeness, OPER(R→
ID, βR), can be achieved.
We consider the following generic RFID protocol, Π. Note that many of the
existing protocols follow this generic form, e.g., weak-private RFID schemes
[26].
1.R→ ID : challenge = VR
2.ID→ R : response = FK(VR, VID)
In this generic form, FK(...) is a PRF (pseudo-random function), VR
is the value generated by the reader and VID is the value generated by
the tag. The reader R can find (ID,K) in the database by the searching
the value of K from database, such that the following predicate is true:
p(challenge, response,K, x). For instance, in Π3 (Appendix A.3) we have,
p(NR, , response, k, x = φ) ::= (response = Fk(NR, b))? true : false.
We can construct eight different concrete protocols, say Π1,Π1, ...,Π8, over
the following three parameters: the challenge VR is random or not; the value
VID is random or not; and the key K is different or not for each tag.
17
Next, we analyze the eight concrete protocols for security and privacy,
using the Adaptable authentication model. As we may recall, there are three
processes involved in the analysis, i.e., abduction and validation process for
Beta argument and the Hybrid process for Alpha argument. The abduction
process is trivial, namely βX = [VR, FK(VR, VID)] for the generic protocol.
The validation process corroborates the operational definitions of relevant Gs,
namely EXST(R → ID, βR) and OPER(R → ID, βR) for the security, and
UNTC(ID,Πi) (where 1 ≤ i ≤ 8) for the privacy.
A concrete Hybrid process can be derived from the generic Hybrid process
described in §2.2. In all of the protocols, deletion, insertion and reordering
is not possible, which justifies the restrictions of the abstract Hybrid process.
So, we only analyze for any undetectable modifications in βR. Let A be an
attacker from one of the attack classes. Let ACCEPT(βR) be an event that
the reader accepts βR. The generic, but concrete, Hybrid process is as follows.
1. Pr(ACCEPT([W ′R, FK(WR,WID)])):
This case analyzes the probability of the event that A select W ′R, where
W ′R 6= WR, in such a way that FK(WR,WID) can be returned to the
reader.
2. Pr(ACCEPT([WR, FK(WR,WID)′])):
This case analyzes the probability of the event that A compute the re-
sponse FK(WR,WID)′, where FK(WR,WID)′ 6= FK(WR,WID), in such
a way that probability of ACCEPT is close to 1.
3. Pr(ACCEPT([W ′R, FK(WR,WID)′])):
This case analyzes the probability of the event that A select W ′R, where
W ′R 6= WR, and compute the response FK(WR,WID)′, where FK(WR,WID)′ 6=
FK(WR,WID), in such a way that probability of ACCEPT is close to 1.
The actual security proofs for the eight concrete protocols can be found in
Appendix A; the result of the analysis is summarized in Table 3.1. Each row
in the table corresponds to one of the concrete protocols; the specific choices
made for WR, WID and K are mentioned in the corresponding columns. The
last column summarizes the result of our analysis, in form of assumptions
required to justify the security and privacy of these protocols. The details of
these assumptions are presented in the following list.
(a) The existence is not achieved, so, e.g., same type of items
should be in Warehouse, or there should be some auxiliary
(e.g., physical) mechanism to distinguish between items if
they are different.
(b) Only one item is presented to the reader R at a time.
(c) The operativeness is not achieved, so, e.g., visual inspection
should be done at Exit to make sure the item with ID is
currently there.
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Protocol K is different VID is random VR is random Results
Π1 No No No {a,b,c,Destructive}
Π2 No No Yes {a,b,Weak}
Π3 No Yes No {a,b,d,e,Coward}
Π4 No Yes Yes {a,b,e,Coward}
Π5 Yes No No {c,h,Destructive }
Π6 Yes No Yes {Destructive }
Π7 Yes Yes No {d,e,Destructive}
Π8 Yes Yes Yes {e,Destructive}
Table 3.1: Concrete Forms of the Generic Protocol
(d) The reader R should query a tag more than once to detect
collisions in the values of WID.
(e) Fk(...) is a PRP (pseudo-random permutation) with an effi-
ciently computable inverse function F−1K (...) (e.g., AES en-
cryption).
(h) Privacy is not possible to achieve within the model, so, privacy
should not be a concern for the items in Warehouse.
Let us consider, for instance, the case Π2 in the table. The protocol Π2
corresponds to a system where all RFID tags share a common key and there is
no pseudo-random generator implemented on the tags. The ith interrogation of
the reader consists of a random challenge NR(i). As shown in the last column
that the protocol is secure and private against Weak class of attackers, as long
as the assumption, (a) and (b), are satisfied. This example illustrates the
types of results that we obtain in Adaptable authentication model, i.e., the
appropriate parameters of authentication model required to justify security
and privacy.
Chapter 4
Discussion
In traditional security analysis, most of the concrete protocols in Table 3.1
are ‘insecure’, with the possible exceptions of Π6 and Π8 (e.g., see the case of
strong privacy [12]). This is due to a strict deductive style interpretation of
classic security argument (Eq. 2.1) and use of a strict notion of attacker in the
corresponding security model. For example, if VR is not random in a concrete
protocol (i.e., one of Π1, Π3 or Π5) then the protocol is simply considered
‘insecure’ under Dolev-Yao attacker [13] — as it is prone to replay attack.
On the other hand, we consider security and privacy as an a-priori assump-
tion, even for the weakest protocol Π1. We infer an attacker model and a set
of assumptions about the environment such that the security can be justified.
It is not always possible to justify a security goal within the model, but this
does not necessarily mean a dead-end to the analysis; Since our security and
privacy goals are formulated at primitive level (compared to single high level
formulation, e.g., matching conversation [8]), impossibility of one fine level
goal does not imply such impossibility for all other goals.
In long run, the proposed model needs to be evaluated on a broader scale,
with more authentication goals and for more general RFID system, albeit,
the results in Table 3.1 are promising for the simple RFID system. In par-
ticular, there are two open questions that we like to address in future. First,
we need to determine whether or not the validity process of β , namely the
Alpha argument, is at most as hard as that of standard security analysis (Eq.
2.1). Secondly, whether or not the operational goals in terms of binding se-
quences are equivalent to some of other standard formulation, e.g., matching
conversation [8], Blinders [26].
4.1 Conclusion
Adaptable authentication model can be used to reason about authentication
protocols that are not normally considered secure as per ’standard authen-
tication model’. We propose the Adaptable authentication model as a step
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towards exploring a rather unexplored area of weaker security. The results
are particularly useful when one needs to optimize security for resource con-
straints, e.g., the protocols Π1 and Π2, which only require a hash function on
the tags, may suffice for the requirements of certain applications.
It must be noted that the Adaptable authentication model does not change
the actual security of a protocol; the model just capture the weak form of se-
curity which otherwise labeled as insecurity under standard model. System
designers, therefore, must be cautious while interpreting the results obtained
in the Adaptable model; security guarantees are accompanied by extra as-
sumptions and typically a weaker attacker model, which may not be justifiable
for every conceivable environment.
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Appendix A
Proofs of Security
In all of the following proofs a, b and k represent constant values. All nonces
are unpredictable; NR and NID are reader-side and tag side nonces respec-
tively. K is a key variable; Ki is the key stored in tag IDi. The values in
a particular instance of a protocol are indexed, e.g., NID(i) and NR(i). The
generic form of hypothesis βR is [VR, FK(VR, VID)].
S is the size (in bits) of output of FK(...). The sizes of nonces are |NR|
and |NID| and |NR| = |NID|. Let q be the total number of queries to FK(...)
or pseudo-random generator. Let n be total number of tags in the system.
Let q < qth and n < nth, for suitable choices for nth and qth (e.g., the birthday
bound).
For simplicity, we rely on asymptotic analysis for calculating different
probabilities. The probabilities, q.2−S , q.2−|NR|, q.2−|NID| and n.2−|K| are
assumed to be negligible. In practice this can be achieved by suitable choices
of cryptographic primitives.
A.1 Π1: (1) R→ IDi : a (2) tagi → R : Fk(a, b)
First, we consider the Beta argument: βR = [a, Fk(a, b)]. We need to show
the following.
Θ,Π1, [a, Fk(a, b)] |= EXST(R→ ID, βR(i)), (A.1)
Θ,Π1, [a, Fk(a, b)] |= OPER(R→ ID, βR(i)), (A.2)
Θ,Π1, [a, Fk(a, b)] |= UNTC(ID,Π1) (A.3)
As per operational definition of EXST(R → ID, βR(i)), R should be able
to distinguish between βR(i) = [a, Fk(a, b)] (for ID) and βR(j) = [a, Fk(a, b)]
(for arbitrary X). As βR(i) = βR(j), the distinguishing is not possible. So,
we include the assumptions, (a) and (b).
For OPER(R → ID, βR(i)), R should be able to distinguish between
βR(i) = [a, Fk(a, b)] and βR(j) = [a, Fk(a, b)], which are two different in-
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stance between R and ID. Again, this is not possible even in honest model,
as βR(i) = βR(j). So, we include the assumption (c).
For UNTC(Π1 → tagi), adversary A should be able to pick a pair with a
probability different from the rest of two pair. The three instances of binding
sequence are same. Hence, Π1 is private.
We use the Alpha argument to validate [a, Fk(a, b)]. Let A be in Destruc-
tive class.
1. Pr(ACCEPT([a′, Fk(a, b)])):
If a′ 6= a, the tag will not respond assuming the tag checks that the
challenge is a. If the tag does not have this check then the probability
of response being Fk(a, b) is only 2−S .
2. Pr(ACCEPT([a, Fk(a, b)′])):
The event ACCEPT can only occur if Fk(a, b)′ = Fk(a, b), which is not
possible as Fk(a, b)′ needs to be a modified version of Fk(a, b).
3. Pr(ACCEPT([a′, Fk(a, b)′])):
Similarly, ACCEPT can only occur if Fk(a, b)′ = Fk(a, b).
Thus, A is from Destructive class.
A.2 Π2: (1) R→ IDi : NR (2) IDi → R : Fk(NR, b)
First we consider the Beta argument. βR in this case is [NR, Fk(NR, b)]
Θ,Π2, [NR, Fk(NR, b)] |= EXST(R→ ID, βR(i)), (A.4)
Θ,Π2, [NR, Fk(NR, b)] |= OPER(R→ ID, βR(i)), (A.5)
Θ,Π2, [NR, Fk(NR, b)] |= UNTC(ID,Π2) (A.6)
For EXST(R→ ID, βR(i)), R should be able to distinguish between βR(i) =
[NR(i), Fk(NR(i), b)] and βR(j) = [NR(j), Fk(NR(j), b)]. Such a distinguish-
ing is not possible as response from all tags is of same type. So, we include
the assumption, (a) and (b).
For OPER(R → ID, βR(i)), R should be able to distinguish between
βR(i) = [NR(i), Fk(NR(i), b)] and βR(j) = [NR(j), Fk(NR(i), b)]. Such a dis-
tinguishing is efficiently computable, although, there are two situations when
this is not possible: NR(i) = NR(j) and Fk(NR(i), b) = Fk(NR(j), b). Since
NR is the output of pseudo-random generator, the former case can only hap-
pen with negligible probability,q.2−|NR|. The later case can only occur with
probability of q.2−S .
For UNTC(ID,Π2), three instances of binding sequence are as follow:
βR(i) = [NR(i), Fk(NR(i), b)] (betweenR and IDi), βR(j) = [NR(j), Fk(NR(j), b)]
(between R and IDi) and βR(k) = [NR(k), Fk(NR(k), b)] (between R and IDj).
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This is not possible as all tags have the same key k and there is no difference
between instances of different tags. Thus, Π2 is private.
Now, we use the Alpha argument to validate [NR, Fk(NR, b)]. Since, the
key k is same for all tags, A can not be from Destructive class. Although the
binding sequence is randomized, A can not be from Forward class as A does
have access to random choice made by R. We start with A in Weak class.
Since, the protocol is randomized for R, so the correctness of the protocol
(behavior when there is no attacker) depends on the fact that each protocol
instance is different. So, in the following we analyze for the two cases: m′i = mi
and m′i 6= mi.
1. [ACCEPT(N ′R, Fk(NR, b)])):
The case, N ′R = NR, can only occur q.2−|NR|. The case, N ′R 6= NR, can
results in Fk(N ′R, b) = Fk(NR, b) with probability q.2−S
2. Pr(ACCEPT([NR, Fk(NR, b)′])):
The case, Fk(NR, b)′ = Fk(NR, b), can only occur q.2−|NR|. The case,
Fk(NR, b)′ 6= Fk(NR, b) has Pr(ACCEPT) = 0.
3. Pr(ACCEPT([N ′R, Fk(N ′R, b)])):
The case, [N ′R, Fk(N ′R, b)] = [NR, Fk(NR, b)], can only occur q.2−|NR|.
The case, [N ′R, Fk(N ′R, b)] 6= [NR, Fk(NR, b)] has Pr(ACCEPT) = 0.
A.3 Π3: (1) R→ IDi : a (2) IDi → R : Fk(a,NID)
The binding sequence βR in this case is [a, Fk(a,NID)]. The corresponding
the Beta arguments are as follow.
Θ,Π3, [a, Fk(a,NID)] |= EXST(R→ ID, βR(i)) (A.7)
Θ,Π3, [a, Fk(a,NID)] |= OPER(R→ ID, βR(i)) (A.8)
Θ,Π3, [a, Fk(a,NID)] |= UNTC(ID,Π3) (A.9)
R should be able to distinguish between βR(i) = [a, Fk(a,NID(i))] and
βR(j) = [a, Fk(a,NID(j))]. This is not possible in as NID(i) and NID(j) are
randomly generated by the tags. So, we include the assumption (a) and (b).
For OPER(R → ID, βR(i)), R should be able to distinguish between
βR(i) = [a, Fk(a,NID(i))] and βR(j) = [a, Fk(a,NID(j))]. This is only possi-
ble if R remembers all received values for NID, otherwise R can not distin-
guish between two instances of the protocol. So, we include the assumption
(d). Even so, R does not know the random choices NID; so, we include the
assumption (e).
For UNTC(Π3 → IDi), the three instances are as follow: βR(i) = [a, Fk(a,NID(i))]
(between R and IDi), βR(j) = [a, Fk(a,NID(j))] (between R and IDi) and
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βR(k) = [a, Fk(a,NID(k))] (between R and tagj). A does not know NID; so,
distinguishing is not possible. Thus, Π2 is private.
We use the Alpha argument to validate the hypothesis [a, Fk(a,NID)].
Since all keys are the same, A can not be from Destructive class. As Π3 is
randomized, A can be from Forward class — A does not know NR; At the
end of attack, A with key k still can not compute Fk(a,NID). But, with the
assumption (e), A can not be Forward because A can invert a response. So,
we start with A in Weak class. Note that the protocol is not randomized for
R, so unlike Π2 we only consider one case — m′i 6= mi
1. Pr(ACCEPT([a′, Fk(a,NID)])):
Similar to the corresponding case of Π1, a′ 6= a is not possible.
2. Pr(ACCEPT([a, Fk(a,NID)′])):
With Fk(a,NID)′ = Fk(a,N ′ID) the event ACCEPT occurs. So, A
should be in Coward class.
3. Pr(ACCEPT([a′, Fk(a′, NID)])):
Similar to the first case, a′ 6= a is not possible.
Hence, A is from Coward class.
A.4 Π4: (1) R→ IDi : NR (2) IDi → R : Fk(NR, NID)
The binding sequence in this case is [NR, Fk(NR, NID)]. The corresponding
Beta argument is as follows.
Θ,Π4, [NR, Fk(NR, NID)] |= EXST(R→ ID, βR(i)) (A.10)
Θ,Π4, [NR, Fk(NR, NID)] |= OPER(R→ ID, βR(i)) (A.11)
Θ,Π4, [NR, Fk(NR, NID)] |= UNTC(ID,Π4) (A.12)
As per operational definition of EXST (R → IDi), R should be able to
distinguish between βR(i) = [NR(i), Fk(NR(i), NID(i))] and βR(j) = [NR(j),
Fk(NR(j), NID(j))]. This is not possible in honest model as all the keys are
same. Similar to Π1,Π2 and Π3, we include the assumptions (a) and (b).
Since, R does not know the random choices NID, so we further assume (e)
Fk(...) is a PRP with an efficiently computable inverse function F−1k (...).
For OPER(R → ID, βR(i)), R should be able to distinguish between
βR(i) = [NR(i), Fk(NR(i), NID(i))] and βR(j) = [NR(j), Fk(NR(j), NID(j))].
With the assumption (e) this is possible due to random challenge NR.
For UNTC(Π4 → IDi), adversary A should be able to pick a pair with a
probability different from the rest of two pair. The three instances of protocol
transcripts are as follow: βR(i) = [NR(i), Fk(NR(i), NID(i))] (between R and
IDi), βR(j) = [NR(j), Fk(NR(j), NID(j))] (between R and IDi) and βR(k) =
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[NR(k), Fk(NR(k), NID(k))] (between R and IDj). As A does not know NID
and NR, the distinguishing is not possible Thus, Π4 is private.
We use the Alpha argument to validate the hypothesis [NR, Fk(NR, NID)].
Since, we assume that tag stores the key that is same for all tags, so the binding
sequence can not be validated for any adversary from Destructive class. Π4 is
randomized so A can be from Forward class, because A does not have access
to random choice made by IDi, namely NR. But, with the assumption (e), A
can compute NR. So, we start with A in Weak class.
1. Pr(ACCEPT([N ′R, Fk(NR, NID)])):
We consider the two cases: N ′R = NR from different instance; and N ′R 6=
NR. The probability for the former case is q.2−|NR|. The probability for
the later case (and still obtaining Fk(NR, NID)) is approximately q.2−S .
2. Pr(ACCEPT([NR, Fk(NR, NID)′])):
We consider the two cases: Fk(NR, NID)′ = Fk(NR, NID) from a dif-
ferent instance; and Fk(NR, NID)′ 6= Fk(NR, N ′ID). The probability of
first case is q.2−S . The second case can occur if A simply relays NR to
another tag. So we need to assume A is from Coward class.
3. Pr(ACCEPT([N ′R, Fk(NR, NID)′])):
We consider the two cases: [N ′R, Fk(NR, NID)′] = [NR, Fk(NR, NID)],
i.e., replay of an instance that occurs with a different tag; and [N ′R, Fk(NR, NID)′]
6= [NR, Fk(NR, NID)]. The probability of first case is q.2−S . The second
case can occur if A simply relays any new N ′R to another tag. So we
need to assume A is from Coward class.
Hence, A is from Coward class.
A.5 Π5: (1) R→ IDi : a (2) IDi → R : FKi(a, b)
First we consider the Beta argument. βR in this case is [a, FKi(a, b)]
Θ,Π2, [a, FKi(a, b)] |= EXST(R→ ID, βR(i)), (A.13)
Θ,Π2, [a, FKi(a, b)] |= OPER(R→ ID, βR(i)), (A.14)
Θ,Π2, [a, FKi(a, b)] |= UNTC(ID,Π5) (A.15)
For EXST(R→ ID, βR(i)), R should be able to distinguish between βR(i) =
[a, FKi(a, b)] and βR(j) = [a, FKj (a, b)]. Such a distinguishing is possible as
Ki is unique for each tag.
For OPER(R → ID, βR(i)), R should be able to distinguish between
βR(i) = [a, FKi(a, b)] and βR(j) = [a, FKi(a, b)]. Such a distinguishing is
not possible; so, we include the assumption (c).
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For UNTC(ID,Π2), adversary A should be able to pick a pair with a
probability different from the rest of two pair. As per operational definition of
untraceability, the three instances of binding sequence are as follow: βR(i) =
[a, FKi(a, b)] (between R and IDi), βR(j) = [a, FKi(a, b)] (between R and IDi)
and βR(k) = [a, FKj (a, b)] (between R and IDj). Clearly, this is possible as
first two instances are exactly same and different from the third one. So,
we need to assume that (h) privacy is of no concern for the items under
consideration.
Now, we use the Alpha argument to validate [a, FKi(a, b)]. Since, we as-
sume that tag stores the key is different for all tags, we start validating the
binding sequence from A in Destructive class.
1. Pr(ACCEPT([a′, FKi(a, b)])):
The case a′ 6= a is not possible.
2. Pr(ACCEPT([a, FKi(a, b)′])):
The event ACCEPT occurs if FKi(a, b)′ = FKj (a, b), for Ki 6= Kj . This
could happen with probability n.2−|K| (n is total number of tags), which
is negligible.
3. Pr(ACCEPT([a′, FKi(a, b)′])):
The case that involves a′ 6= a is not possible.
Hence, A is Destructive class.
A.6 Π6: (1) R→ ID : NR (2) ID→ R : FK(NR, b)
In this case, βR = [NR, FKi(NR, b)].
Θ,Π6, [NR, FKi(NR, b)] |= EXST(R→ ID, βR(i)), (A.16)
Θ,Π6, [NR, FKi(NR, b)] |= OPER(R→ ID, βR(i)), (A.17)
Θ,Π6, [NR, FKi(NR, b)] |= UNTC(ID,Π6) (A.18)
For EXST(R→ ID, βR(i)), R should be able to distinguish between βR(i) =
[NR(i), FKi(NR(i), b)] and βR(j) = [NR(j), FKj (NR(j), b)]. Clearly, such a
distinguishing is possible as Ki is unique for each tag.
For OPER(R → ID, βR(i)), R should be able to distinguish between
βR(i) = [NR(i), FKi(NR(i), b)] and βR(j) = [NR(j), FKi(NR(j), b)]. Clearly,
such a distinguishing is possible as NR is unique in each query, except with a
negligible probability of 2−|NR|.
As per operational definition of untraceability, the three instances of bind-
ing sequence are as follow: βR(i) = [NR(i), FKi(NR(i), b)] (between R and
IDi), βR(j) = [NR(j), FKi(NR(j), b)] (between R and IDi) and βR(k) =
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[NR(k), FKj (NR(k), b)] (between R and IDj). Clearly, this is not possible
for adversary as all three responses are randomized due to NR.
Now, we use the Alpha argument to validate [NR, FK(NR, b)]. Since, we
assume that tag stores the key is different for all tags, so we start with A in
Destructive class.
1. Pr(ACCEPT([N ′R, FK(NR, b)])):
We now consider two cases. The first case is N ′R = NR but N ′R is
from different instance. The second case is N ′R 6= NR. The first case
can occur with a probability q.2−|NR|. The second case can produce
FK(NR, b)] with a probability q.2−S .
2. Pr(ACCEPT([NR, FK(NR, b)′])):
The possible construction of FK(NR, b)′ 6= FK(NR, b) that can produce
ACCEPT is FK(NR, b)′ = FK′(NR, b), which can occur with a negligible
probability of n.2−|K|. The probability, Pr(FK(NR, b)′ = FK(NR, b))
from a different instance is approximately n.2−S + q.2−|NR|.
3. Pr(ACCEPT([N ′R, FK(NR, b)′] ∧ACCEPT ):
There are two cases here. If [N ′R, FK(NR, b)′] = [NR, FK(NR, b)] then
this is the case of replay from different binding sequence. Probability
that such a case occurs is approximately n.2−S + q.2−|NR|. The other
case, [a′, FK(a,NID)′] 6= [a, FK(a,NID)] can result in ACCEPT event
with a probability of n.2−|K|.
Hence, A is in Destructive class.
A.7 Π7: (1) R→ IDi : a (2) IDi → R : FK(a,NID)
For this construction, βR = [a, FKi(a,NID)] The Beta arguments are as follow.
Θ,Π7, [a, FKi(a,NID)] |= EXST(R→ ID, βR(i)), (A.19)
Θ,Π7, [a, FKi(a,NID)] |= OPER(R→ ID, βR(i)), (A.20)
Θ,Π7, [a, FKi(a,NID)] |= UNTC(ID,Π7) (A.21)
For EXST(R→ ID, βR(i)), R should be able to distinguish between βR(i) =
[a, FKi(a,NID(i))] and βR(j) = [a, FKj (a,NID(j))]. Theoretically, such a dis-
tinguishing is possible asKi is unique for each tag. Practically, there is another
problem; R does not know the random choice NID made by the tag. Thus,
(e) FK(...) should be an PRP with an efficiently computable F−1K (...).
For OPER(R → ID, βR(i)), R should be able to distinguish between
βR(i) = [a, FKi(a,NID(i))] and βR(j) = [a, FKi(a,NID(j))]. Even with the
assumption (e), such a distinguishing is not possible as R ca not predict the
random choice NID made by the tag. So, we need to assume (d) reader query
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a tag more than once and detects the collisions in the random values obtained
from the tag.
The three instances of binding sequence are as follow: βR(i) = [a, FKi(a,NID(i))]
(between R and IDi), βR(j) = [a, FKi(a,NID(j))] (between R and IDi) and
βR(k) = [a, FKj (a,NID(k))] (between R and IDj). Clearly, this is not possi-
ble.
Now, we use the Alpha argument to validate [a, FKi(a,NID)]. Since each
tag has its own unique key, so we start with A in Destructive class.
1. Pr(ACCEPT([a′, FKi(a,NID)])):
The case a′ 6= a can not occur.
2. Pr(ACCEPT([a, FKi(a,NID)′])):
There are two cases here:
[a, FKi(a,NID)′] = [a, FK′i(a,NID)] and [a, FKi(a,NID)
′] = [a, FKi(a,N ′ID)].
Both of these cases occur with a negligible probability.
3. Pr(ACCEPT([a′, FKi(a,NID)′] ∧ACCEPT ):
This case is similar to the previous case.
Hence, A can be from Destructive class.
A.8 Π8: (1) R→ IDi : NR (2) IDi → R : FK(NR, NID)
We start with the Beta argument. βR in this case is [NR, FKi(NR, NID)] We
need to show the validity of following arguments.
Θ,Π8, [NR, FKi(NR, NID)] |= EXST(R→ ID, βR(i)), (A.22)
Θ,Π8, [NR, FKi(NR, NID)] |= OPER(R→ ID, βR(i)), (A.23)
Θ,Π8, [NR, FKi(NR, NID)] |= UNTC(ID,Π8) (A.24)
For EXST(R→ ID, βR(i)), R should be able to distinguish between βR(i) =
[NR(i), FKi(NR(i), NID(i))] and βR(j) = [NR(j), FKj (NR(j), NID(j))]. Such
a distinguishing is possible as Ki is unique for each tag. Since R does not
know the random choice NID made by the tag, we include the assumption
(e).
For OPER(R → ID, βR(i)), R should be able to distinguish between
βR(i) = [NR(i), FKi(NR(i), NID(i))] and βR(j) = [NR(j), FKi(NR(j), NID(j))].
Clearly, such a distinguishing is possible as NR is different for each tag, but
we also need to include the assumption (e).
For UNTC(ID,Π8), adversary A should be able to pick a pair with a
probability different from the rest of two pair. As per operational defini-
tion of untraceability, the three instances of binding sequence are as fol-
low: βR(i) = [NR(i), FKi(NR(i), NID(i))] (between R and IDDi), βR(j)
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= [NR(j), FKi(NR(j), NID(j))] (between R and IDi) and βR(k) = [NR(k),
FKk(NR(k), NID(k))] (between R and IDj). Clearly, this is not possible for
adversary.
We start by assuming A in Destructive class.
1. Pr(ACCEPT([N ′R, FK(NR, NID)])):
The first case is N ′R = NR with N ′R from a different instance. The
second case is N ′R 6= NR but generates FK(NR, NID). The first case
can occur with a probability q.2−|NR|. The second case can occur with
a probability n.2−S
2. Pr(ACCEPT([NR, FK(NR, NID)′])):
The first case, Pr(FK(NR, NID)′ = FK(NR, NID)) from a different
sequence, can occur with n.2−S . The second case, FK(NR, NID)′ 6=
FK(NR, NID) can lead to ACCEPT for FK′(NR, NID) and FK(NR, N ′ID);
both of them have a negligible probability of occurrence.
3. Pr(ACCEPT([N ′R, FK(NR, NID)′] ∧ACCEPT ):
The analysis is similar to the previous case.
Hence A can be from Destructive class.

